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Abstract 
Failures in governance, especially in regard to boards of directors, have been blamed for the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. The increased public scrutiny regarding the actions and role of the board of directors in 
banks, following the crisis, inspires to examine whether and to what extent the characteristics of banks’ 
boards influence their performance in the crisis. Using a sample of 72 publicly listed European banks, we 
find that banks with more independent and busy boards experienced worse stock returns during the crisis. 
Conversely, the better performing banks had more banking experts serving as supervisory directors. 
Additionally, we find that gender and age diversity improved banks’ performance during the crisis; hence, 
diversity matters. We also construct a governance quality index on the basis of board characteristics and 
conclude that governance quality positively affects banks’ returns during the crisis. Overall, we find 
evidence that banks’ performance during the financial crisis is a function of their boards’ characteristics. 
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1. Introduction  
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has been described as the most serious crisis since the Great Depression,1-3 
having important effects on the real economy and posing challenges for economists, regulators and 
policymakers.4 In fact, the US subprime market crisis had a major impact on financial institutions and banks 
all over the world, causing a drop in market capitalisation, liquidity problems, defaults and bailouts. Many 
have argued that poor governance contributed to the collapse of a large number of many banks throughout 
the world. While nearly every bank suffered during the crisis period, some banks were much more affected 
than others, despite being exposed to the same macroeconomic factors. 
 
In this paper, we explore whether and to what extent certain board characteristics affected banks’ 
performance during the financial crisis. Our work is important for various reasons. First, very little is known 
about the effectiveness of banking firm governance,5 and understanding the latter has become even more 
important in the context of the financial crisis. Most of the studies exclude financial firms from their sample, 
while the European context is very sparsely analysed by the literature. Second, boards are one of the most 
important corporate governance mechanisms that monitor and evaluate management (playing a supervisory 
role), make managerial decisions such as which projects to undertake and which employees to hire (playing 
a managerial role) and offer valuable advice (playing an advisory role) which is especially important in 
certain types of firmsa (e.g., Coles et al,6 Fama and Jensen,7 Weisbach,8 Adams and Mehran,9 Adams and 
Ferreira,10 Andres and Vallelado,11 Adams et al12 and Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach13). Third, panic should 
be a momentous event for economic research,4 so the financial crisis constitutes an obvious natural event 
for investigation which must be carefully analysed. Fourth, our research offers insights to policymakers 
and bank regulators by showing whether or not governance mechanisms - as features of boards - matter, 
especially in adverse macroeconomic conditions. Fifth, the existing literature on the relationship between 
corporate boards and performance shows mixed results. One reason commonly cited for the inconclusive 
results is that a significant number of these studies fail to account for the endogeneity issue that emerges 
from the joint determination of board structure and firm value.14 “Endogeneity leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates that make reliable inference virtually impossible.”15(p6) Thus, the findings 
of the studies that examine the board structure-performance relationship must be analysed with caution if 
the empirical methods do not check adequately for all relevant sources of endogeneity.16 In our research 
this issue is less likely to be problematic because the financial crisis is an exogenous macroeconomic 
shock.17-19 Hence, by testing a set of board characteristics immediately before the external shock in order 
to explain changes in banks value, we can largely eliminate the endogeneity concern. 
 
Our sample is composed of 72 publicly listed European banks from 17 countries. We have drawn several 
conclusions from our results. The better performing banks during the financial crisis had, in 2006, less 
independent and busy boards, but more banking experience and more diversity (gender and age). 
Interestingly, banks with the highest returns in 2006 had the worst stock returns during the crisis. Moreover, 
banks’ performance during the crisis was positively related to capital and market-to-book ratios and 
negatively related to institutional ownership before the crisis. Finally, banks with a corporate governance 
committee in 2006 performed better during the crisis period. This suggests that having a corporate 
governance committee gives banks greater ability to evaluate and adapt their governance; hence, flexibility 
matters. Additionally, we construct a governance index to proxy for governance quality, where we find that 
better governance, according to governance policies, improved banks’ performance during the crisis. 
 
Although we focus on bank-level governance mechanisms, we also examine how country-level governance 
mechanisms - such as the quality of legal institutions, the extent of laws protecting shareholders’ rights and 
creditors’ rights protection - influenced banks’ performance during the crisis. We find that protection of 
shareholders’ rights is positively related to bank performance, but the general quality of the legal system 
and creditors’ rights protection is not. 
 
                                            
a Complex firms, such as those that operate in multiple segments, are large in size, or have high leverage are likely to have greater 
advising requirements.6  
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Our paper contributes to the academic governance studies that have attempted to understand the role of 
corporate boards in the crisis period, such as those of Erkens et al,18 Francis et al19 and Adams.20 We 
complement the existing literature by showing that bank-level differences in boards are crucial to 
determining changes in bank performance during the crisis. Moreover, our study provides evidence 
consistent with the financial crisis, being a unique event in which board members play a critical role. While 
the vast majority of the existing studies analyses United States (US) firms, our research focuses on 
European banks from several different countries. Additionally, our research extends the literature by 
examining a broad set of bank’s board characteristics, namely experience, education, diversity, busyness 
and activity. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first that examines diversity in its multiple dimensions: 
gender, nationality and age. 
 
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and the hypotheses 
development, Section 3 describes the data and methodology, Section 4 provides the empirical results, 
Section 5 presents the robustness tests and Section 6 provides the conclusion. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
2.1. Board independence and performance 
The emphasis on the board independence in both academic and practitioner work suggests that independent 
directors are better monitors of the management because they have concerns about their personal reputation 
affecting their ability to receive additional director appointments.7 Gilson21 supports the importance of 
director reputation by finding evidence that “directors who resign from financially distressed firms 
subsequently serve on fewer boards of other companies.”(p386) However, the empirical findings are mixed 
on the relation between independence and performance. Some academic literature provides evidence that 
the contribution of independent directors to firm performance is positive. Rosenstein and Wyatt22 examine 
shareholder wealth effects surrounding the appointment of an outside director and conclude that the stock 
price reacts positively to the nomination. Moreover, O’Connell and Cramer23 find a positive and significant 
association between quoted Irish firms’ performance and the percentage of non-executives on the board. 
More recently, Francis et al19 find no significant relationship between traditional board independence and 
non-financial firms’ performance during the crisis. Nevertheless, when the authors redefine independent 
directors as outside directors who preceded the current Chief Executive Officer (CEO), named “strong 
independent” directors, they find a significant and positive relationship between board independence and 
performance.  
However, notwithstanding these findings, there is a relative scarcity of empirical evidence indicating a 
significant positive association between firm performance and board independence. A stream of theoretical 
research suggests however that the effectiveness of outsiders may depend on the information environment 
and be limited by their inferior information compared to corporate insiders. Thus, in a context of high 
information asymmetry the inclusion of more inside directors may be beneficial, as they have greater 
specific information about the firm’s activities.7 In addition, for Adams and Ferreira10 the potential 
disadvantage of outside directors is that they may lack relevant firm-specific information.b Similarly, Coles 
et al6 provide evidence that firms for which the firm-specific knowledge of insiders is relatively important 
are likely to benefit from greater insider representation on the board. This is relevant for firms operating in 
more uncertain environments; namely, those that have a greater need for specialised knowledge, 24 as is the 
case for banks. In fact, “independent directors are less likely to have an in-depth knowledge of the internal 
workings of the banks on whose boards they sit. They are also less likely to have the financial expertise to 
understand the complexity of the securitization processes banks were engaging in or to assess the 
associated risks banks were taking on.” 20(p32) Consistent with this view, Erkens et al18 find that financial 
                                            
b The problem associated with outside directors’ lack of firm-specific knowledge may be exacerbated for banks because 
regulatory restrictions may act to limit the pool of directors from which they can choose5 and because of the complex nature of 
their businesses.20 
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firms with more independent boards experienced worse stock returns during the crisis period, while 
Adams20 gives evidence that banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more independent than 
in other banks. Following the same line, Pathan and Faff24 note that independent directors decrease US 
bank’s performance. Given the regulatory nature and complexity of the banking business, whose activity 
is developed in a high information asymmetry environment, the inclusion of more independent directors 
might be not reflected in an increased performance as they may not always have the knowledge required. 
Hence, the above discussion leads to our first hypothesis (H1): H1: More independent directors had a 
negative impact on bank performance during the financial crisis. 
 
 
2.2. Board size and performance 
The negative relation between board size and firm performance is one of the most common findings in the 
research into the governance of non-financial firms’.14 This has been attributed to lack of cohesiveness of 
larger boards, as well as to their higher coordination and communication costs.25-27 These costs capture the 
difficulty in decision-making as the board size increases. Hence, smaller boards should be more effective 
because decision-making costs are lower in smaller groups.20 For banks, the literature is not very abundant 
and the results are mixed. In fact, existing studies report either a positive relation,5 a negative relation,24,28 
an inverted U-shaped relation11,29 or no association between board size and performance.30 Given the unique 
bank operating environment and complex organisational structure, a larger board should facilitate manager 
supervision and compliance with regulatory requirements (regulation distinguishes the banking industry 
from other industries), bring more human capital to advise managers and help enlarging the network of 
relationships, particularly with larger numbers of customers and depositors. Nevertheless, boards with too 
many members may lead to problems of coordination, control and flexibility in decision-making. Thus, the 
relationship could become negative when the board becomes too large, which may impair bank 
performance due to a lack of efficiency and increased agency conflicts. Performance improvement can thus 
reach a limit as the board grows; in other words, bank performance may increase as the number of 
supervisory directors increases to a point where the relation hits a maximum point from which performance 
will decrease. Accordingly, we expect a nonlinear relation between board size and bank performance. Thus, 
the second hypothesis (H2) can be stated as follows: H2: Board size had a concave or inverted U-shaped 
relationship with bank performance during the financial crisis. 
 
 
2.3. CEO duality and performance 
It has long been argued that when the CEO is also the Chairmanc the motivation of the board to monitor 
and oversee management is compromised due to lack of independence and conflicts of interests.26 
Supporters of the separation between the CEO and Chairman roles argue that when the CEO is also the 
Chairman the agency costs are higher as the ability to supervise the CEO is reduced – Entrenchment 
Theory.7,25,26 This reduction in board oversight facilitates the pursuance of the CEO's agenda,31 which may 
diverge from shareholders’ goals and thus negatively affect firm performance. On the other hand, advocates 
of the combination of the two roles defend that the choice of board leadership is based on the firm’s 
economic and business environments. Thus, joining both functions in the same individual may be best 
suited to a firm's conditions – Efficiency Theory.32,33 
In the context of the financial crisis and for non-financial companies, Francis et al19 find a negative but not 
statistically significant relationship between “duality” and performance. Consequently, board duality does 
not have a significant impact on performance. Furthermore, in the financial crisis, but regarding US 
commercial banks, Grove et al29 show that CEO duality is negatively associated with bank performance. 
The opacity of banks,36-38,d the very nature of banking business and the regulatory and valuation difficulties 
also weaken the potential role of the market for corporate control39 and can therefore reduce the CEO 
                                            
c We refer to the combination of the roles of the CEO and the Chairman of the board as CEO duality. So, CEO duality exists 
when a firm's CEO also serves as Chairman of the board of directors.  
d Not only are bank balance sheets clearly opaque,34 but also “rapid developments in technology and increased financial 
sophistication have challenged the ability of traditional regulation and supervision to foster a safe and sound banking 
system.”35(p33) 
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discipline further, which makes it more important to separate leadership roles at banks. Hence, the third 
hypothesis (H3) is as follows: H3: CEO duality had a negative impact on bank performance during the 
financial crisis. 
 
 
2.4. Board experience and performance  
The effectiveness of the internal control mechanisms in any financial or non-financial institution relies, to 
a great extent, on the monitoring and advising abilities of its board of directors. There is a recent and 
increasing agreement that the strict and effective performance of both the monitoring and advisory roles 
depends on directors’ experience.40-42 For Hau and Thum,40 for example, effective monitoring of bank 
managers may involve industry-specific knowledge which depends on experience. Some recent literature 
has investigated the impact of directors’ financial expertise on banks’ performance during the recent 
financial crisis.40,41 Fernandes and Fich41 have shown that US banks with more financially experienced 
board members did better during the crisis. In particular, banks with more financial experts serving as 
outside directors exhibited better stock return performance during the crisis and received less bailout aid 
from the US government. Likewise, in examining the 29 largest German banks, Hau and Thum40 conclude 
that financial expertise of the supervisory board correlates with crisis performance. The studies above 
suggest that a widespread lack of financial expertise in the boards of a large number of banks appear to 
have played a significant role in the recent crisis. Thus, we can reasonably expect that directors’ banking 
experience influenced European banks’ performance during the financial crisis. Our fourth hypothesis (H4) 
is then stated as follows: H4 Supervisory directors’ banking experience had a positive impact on banks’ 
performance during the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.5. Board education and performance 
In addition to banking experience, directors’ qualifications may influence bank performance, as educational 
level leads to better judgments on a particular investment strategy and thus, to better corporate decisions. 
This is particularly important in the case of banks because the complexity of their activity often requires a 
great amount of specific knowledge. OECD Corporate Governance Principles, more specifically “the 
annotation to Principle VI.E.3 (board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their 
responsibilities) touches on board training and refers that “this might include that board members acquire 
appropriate skills upon appointment (…).””43p(23) Widespread belief that director qualifications and 
experience matter is also reflected in the amendments to the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
disclosure rules introduced in December 2009. The amendments are intended to improve disclosures 
regarding risk, corporate governance, director qualifications and compensation.e However, academic papers 
emphasise experience rather than qualifications. We conjecture that qualifications matter for the managing 
ability of executive directors as well as for the monitoring and advising abilities of supervisory directors. 
Unfortunately, when studying the biographies of board members, we were unable to obtain sufficient data 
on the level of directors' qualifications. Hence, we will use as proxy education of board the average number 
of directors’ qualifications. Therefore, our fifth hypothesis (H5) is the following: H5: Supervisory directors’ 
number of qualifications had a positive impact on bank performance during the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.6. Board diversity and performance 
The limitations related to some traditional, and more extensively studied, board characteristics in explaining 
firms’ performance have spurred finance researchers to investigate whether other board features, such as 
diversity, can improve board effectiveness. The link between board diversity and shareholder value is 
relatively new, although since the 1990s at least research has supported expectations of improved 
performance and increased value for firms that implement diversity initiatives, thereby promoting action 
                                            
e For more details see: http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/33-9089-secg.htm 
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for managing diversity.44,45 Firms which encourage diversity can create competitive advantages in several 
dimensions of business performance: cost, attraction of human resources, marketing success, creativity and 
innovation, problem-solving quality and organisational flexibility.44 Moreover, greater diversity in board 
member characteristics has been advocated as a way of improving organisational performance by providing 
boards with new insights and perspectives.46 Although board diversity has several dimensions, the literature 
reveals a predominance of gender diversity,24,47-53 being much less frequent ethnic diversity47,48,53 and 
political ideology.54  
 
Following the increased attention that gender diversity has received, boards around the world are under 
increasing pressure to choose female directors. In fact, many proposals for governance reform explicitly 
emphasise the importance of gender diversity in the board. The most severe promotion of gender diversity 
took place in Norway where, since January 2008, all listed companies must have 40% female directors.50,52 
In the context of the financial crisis, Francis et al19 present evidence that female board representation did 
not affect non-financial firms’ performance. On the contrary, García-Meca et al55 find that gender diversity 
improves bank performance, confirming the positive role of female directors on banks performance. 
Nevertheless, in regard to banks, or even financial firms, there is a clear lack of empirical studies examining 
the link between performance and gender diversity, although in the light of the financial crisis this issue 
has been raised and publicly discussed, particularly in the media. Kristof56 has noticed the lack of women 
in banks around the world and implicitly suggested that male domination may have contributed to their 
recent poor performance. Similarly, Harriet Harman, United Kingdom (UK) Deputy Leader of the Labor 
Party, laid the blame for the financial meltdown on the male domination of the top jobs in banking and 
argued that the financial crisis would have been less extreme if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman 
Sisters.57 More recently, European Union commissioner Michel Barnier suggested that having more women 
on bank boards would help prevent the kind of “group-think” that exacerbated the crisis.58 In their research, 
Pathan and Faff24 find that although gender diversity improved US bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) period, the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX and crisis periods. 
In formulating our expectation related to gender diversity and European banks performance in the financial 
crisis we rely on the public belief of the value of gender diversity. Thus, our sixth hypothesis and the first 
related to board diversity (H6.1) is stated as follows: H6.1: The proportion of female supervisory directors’ 
on board had a positive impact on bank performance during the financial crisis.  
 
National culture has an important impact on executive mindsets, as demonstrated by the fact that executives 
from differing cultural background are not equally open to change in organisational strategy and leadership 
profiles,59 as well as in the interpretation and response to strategic issues.60 Group members drawn from 
various nationalities tend to differ in ways that have substantial implications for group functioning, since 
national culture has a significant effect on the outlook, perceptions and behaviour of individuals.61 Masulis 
et al62 show that firms with foreign independent directors (FID) exhibit significantly poorer performance, 
especially as their business presence in the FID’s home region becomes less important. Moreover, 
according to García-Meca et al55 nationality diversity, measured as the percentage of foreign directors, has 
a negative impact on bank performance. However, the percentage of foreign directors may not be the best 
measure to represent nationality diversity. In fact, a high percentage can be obtained with a large number 
of foreign directors from a single country. In contrast, Nielsen and Nielsen63 find that top management team 
nationality diversity is positively related to performance. Nationally diverse boards provide wide and 
complementary knowledge, as well as experiences in different institutional contexts, which enhance the 
quality of decisions through more innovative solutions, for example. However, the territorial scope of 
activities of banks may offset (at least some of) the advantages of nationality diversity. Despite these 
conflicting arguments, we advance for now with our sixth hypothesis and the second related to board 
diversity (H6.2), stated as follow: H6.2: More nationality diversity amongst the supervisory directors’ on 
board had a positive impact on bank performance during the financial crisis.  
 
An individual's age is expected to influence strategic decision-making perspectives and choices.64 However, 
there are mixed views on how a director’s average age impacts agency conflicts and, subsequently, firm 
performance.29 On the one hand, older directors have more knowledge and experience, which might 
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facilitate effective monitoring and attenuate agency costs. On the other hand, flexibility decreases and both 
rigidity and resistance to change increase as people age.64 Older directors might also lack the incentive and 
energy to actively monitor managers, thereby increasing agency problems.29 Although no study that directly 
examines the effect of age diversity on performance was found, we believe that the relation between age 
diversity and bank performance can be positive, as such diversity may bring different points of view and 
perspectives to the board and, consequently, better decisions and performance. Therefore, our sixth 
hypothesis and the third related to board diversity (H6.3) is formulated as follows: H6.3: More supervisory 
directors’ age diversity on board had a positive impact on bank performance during the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.7. Board busyness and performance 
The literature disagrees on the link between the number of directorships held by directors and firm 
performance. In fact, the evidence on the association between busyness of directors and firm value is mixed. 
The first strand of literature argues that busy directors will positively affect firm performance. Fama and 
Jensen7 suggest that multiple directorship signal director’s abilities/quality. Similarly, Gilson,21 Kaplan and 
Reishus,65 Ferris et al66 and Fich and Shivdasani,67 amongst others, provide additional evidence that 
multiple directorships certify the quality of a director. In this view, the number of directorships held by a 
director might proxy for reputational capital, as higher quality directors are more frequently asked to serve 
on additional boards – Reputational Hypothesis. The second strand of literature defends the proposition 
that busy outside directors may be less effective monitors. The Busyness Hypothesis postulates that serving 
on too many directorships reduces directors’ time and attention and, consequently, their ability to monitor 
management, thereby decreasing firm value. While the number of directorships, according to some studies, 
appears to be closely linked to directors’ reputational capital, other studies suggest that too many 
directorships may lower the effectiveness of outside directors as corporate monitors (e.g., Core et al,68 
Shivdasani and Yermack,69 Loderer and Peyer,70 Fich and Shivdasani71 and Cashman et al72). Regarding 
the financial crisis period Francis et al19 find that the number of directorships has no impact on non-financial 
firms’ performance. However, Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn73 report a positive relationship between outside 
director busyness and subprime lending in the period 1997-2005, supporting the view that serving on 
multiple boards may compromise a director’s ability to effectively perform monitoring duties. Bearing in 
mind, the two conflicting arguments presented above and considering the specificities associated with 
banking activity and times of crisis, we expect that the costs of having busy directors outweigh the benefits 
related to the additional connections/network of contacts that such directors may bring. Hence, our seventh 
hypothesis (H7) can be stated as: H7: Having busier supervisory directors’ on board, measured by the 
average number of directorships, had a negative impact on bank performance during the financial crisis.  
 
 
2.8. Board activity and performance 
In the agency framework, the intensity of board activity, measured by the frequency of board meetings, 
may indicate an active monitoring role for corporate boards and thus influence corporate performance. 
According to this view, board meetings are beneficial to shareholders. Conger et al74 suggest that board 
meeting time is an important mechanism in improving board’s effectiveness. The higher the frequency of 
meetings, the greater the supervision of the top management, indicating a more effective monitoring role 
which might mitigate agency costs and subsequently improve firm performance.29 An opposing view is that 
board meetings are not necessarily useful because, given their limited time, they cannot be used for the 
meaningful exchange of ideas among directors or with management.26 Moreover, routine tasks absorb much 
of the meetings limiting opportunities for outside directors to exercise meaningful control over 
management.75 Concerning US banks’, Grove et al29 find weak evidence that board meeting frequency is 
positively associated with financial performance. The more frequent the meetings, the increased 
supervision of the top management, which might mitigate agency costs and subsequently improve bank 
performance. Consistent with this view, our final hypothesis (H8) is thus formulated as follows: H8: Board 
meeting frequency was positively associated with bank performance during the financial crisis.  
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3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Sampling procedure and composition 
Our sample consists of 72 publicly listed banks from seventeen European countries.f We use the following 
criteria to compile our sample. First, we limit our sample to European banks that were publicly listed at the 
end of December 2005; that is, they were listed at least one complete year before the beginning of the crisis, 
and not delisted during the crisis period. This provides a total of 191 banks. Second, we confine our sample 
to banks with common shares traded on a regulated market and also that are not a subsidiary of a bank 
already included in the sample to prevent duplication of data. These restrictions reduce our sample to 164 
banks. Third, we restrict our sample to banks covered by BoardEx, our data source on board information, 
and Datastream. While BoardEx is the leading database on the board composition of publicly listed firms, 
only a limited number of European banks are covered in the database. So, our final sample consists of 72 
publicly listed banks. Nevertheless, our sample is representative as it corresponds to 44.2% of total banks 
that meet our criteria.  
 
 
3.2. Variables description 
As with the studies of Beltratti and Stulz,3 Erkens et al,18 Francis et al,19 Fahlenbrach and Stulz,76 Aebi et 
al,77 and Fahlenbrach et al,78 we collect data on various variables for the year 2006, the last complete year 
before the beginning of the financial crisis. Appendix A provides a detailed definition of the variables used 
in this study, the measurement period and data sources.  
 
 
3.2.1. Performance variable 
Similar to the research of Beltratti and Stulz,3 Erkens et al,18 Fahlenbrach and Stulz,76 and Fahlenbrach et 
al,78 our measure of performance is buy-and-hold stock returns over the crisis period. We gathered data on 
bank’s stock returns from Datastream database. 
 
 
3.2.2. Board characteristics variables 
We focus our analysis on the following: board independence and board size (according to Denis and 
McConnell,79 these are the two characteristics that have been more extensively studied in US), CEO duality, 
board experience, board education, board diversity, board busyness and board activity. The data was 
obtained from BoardEx and Datastream databases, as well as from annual reports, and refers to 2006 (i.e. 
prior to the onset of the crisis) as with the studies of Beltratti and Stulz,3 Erkens et al,18 Francis et al,19 
Fernandes and Fich41 and Fahlenbrach and Stulz.76 BoardEx provides detailed information on the board’s 
composition of publicly listed firms. Recent studies also rely on BoardEx as a source of governance and 
board data  (e.g., Erkens et al,18 Fernandes and Fich,41 Engelberg et al,80 and van Essen et al 81).  
We define “Board independence” as the percentage of independent directors. BoardEx does not classify 
directors as independent in its own analysis; rather, when it classifies a director as an independent director 
it is because the company that they work for has disclosed them as such. In other words, BoardEx takes the 
company's classification for granted and accordingly provides this information. However, this fact does not 
constitute a serious problem because, to the best of our knowledge, the Codes of Best Practices of European 
countries tend to converge in the definition of board independence. “Board size” is defined as the total 
number of directors, while “CEO duality” is a binary variable equal to one if the CEO is also the Chairman 
and zero otherwise. “Board experience” is measured by the supervisory directors’ average years of 
experience in the banking sector. “Board education” is calculated as the average number of qualifications 
held by supervisory directors. Although it was useful to use the average level of directors' qualifications, 
we are unable to use it because, by examining each director's biography, we obtain insufficient data on their 
level of qualifications. Board diversity is measured in three different but complementary ways: gender 
                                            
f The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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diversity (“Women”), calculated as the percentage of supervisory directors on board that are female; 
nationality diversity (“Nationality_mix”), computed as the proportion of supervisory directors from 
different countries; and age diversity (“Age diversity”), defined as the standard deviation of supervisory 
directors’ age. “Board busyness” is calculated as the average number of board positions, this is the number 
of directorships held by supervisory directors; finally, “Board activity” is measured by the annual number 
of board meetings.  
 
 
3.2.3. Control variables 
Following previous studies such as Adams and Mehran,5 Erkens et al,18 Francis et al19 and Pathan and 
Faff,24 some control variables are included to account for several factors that might affect banks’ stock 
performance. The first one is the performance in 2006, measured as the buy-and-hold stock returns from 
January 2006 to December 2006, to control for prior bank performance (“2006 performance”). The second 
is the bank’s size, measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (“Bank size”). The third is 
bank’s capital, measured as the ratio of total equity to total assets (“Capital”). The fourth is the market-to-
book ratio measured as the market value of equity to the book value of equity (“MBR”). Other variables 
include “Institutional ownership”, to control for ownership structure, measured as the percentage of shares 
owned by institutional investors and “CG committee”, a binary variable that equals one if the bank has a 
corporate governance committee and zero otherwise.  
 
 
3.3. Timeline of the study 
We conduct our empirical analysis using two different alternative definitions of the crisis period. First, as 
Beltratti and Stulz,3 Fernandes and Fich,41 Fahlenbrach and Stulz,76 Aebi et al,77 Fahlenbrach et al,78 and 
van Essen et al81 and we define our crisis period from July 2007 to December 2008. Admittedly, according 
to Beltratti and Stulz3 and Fahlenbrach and Stulz,76 the crisis did not end in December 2008 and bank stocks 
lost substantial ground in the first quarter of 2009. However, during that period the banking sector suffered 
losses not observed since the Great Depression. Moreover, subsequent losses were at least partly affected 
by uncertainty about the possibility of banks’ nationalisation. Second, we investigate the robustness of our 
results using an alternative crisis period from January 2007 to September 2008 as Erkens et al.18 In this 
case, the crisis period is defined as starting at the beginning of 2007, because the first wave of the crisis 
started in the early 2007,82,g and ending at the third quarter of 2008 for two main raisons: (1) at the end of 
the third quarter of 2008, regulators in various countries imposed short-selling prohibitions on the stocks 
of many financial institutions to contain sharp falls of their stock prices18 and (2) in October 2008 the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued amendments to grant companies the option of 
abandoning fair value recognition for selected financial assets. Such changes allowed companies to 
reclassify financial assets from market value based on historical cost based valuation.18 Thus, some 
European banks use the reclassification option to forgo the recognition of fair value losses.83 In order to 
avoid the confounding effects of government intervention, Erkens et al18 choose the third quarter of 2008 
as the end of the crisis period.  
 
 
3.4. Empirical model and estimation method  
 
3.4.1. Bank performance and board characteristics 
We examine the relation between bank performance and board characteristics during the crisis by 
regressing buy-and-hold-stock return on our board characteristics and control variables using the Weighted 
Least Squares (WLS) model. The WLS model provides one method for dealing with heteroscedasticity. 
We expect that the source of heteroscedasticity is bank size, so we test for heteroscedasticity for two 
measures of bank´s size - bank’s assets and bank’s market capitalisation - and we conclude that the last is, 
                                            
g Although in early 2007 the market first realised the severity of the subprime mortgages problems, the credit crunch did not 
really begin until July 2007.82 
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in the fact, the source of heteroscedasticity. Our sample includes several different countries, such as Cyprus 
and Germany, leading to major differences in the size of banks. Additionally, we test for model 
misspecification and we conclude that the model is correctly specified. 
 
Our formal first regression model is as follows: 
 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−12  + 𝛽4(𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽5(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
   + 𝛽7(𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8(𝑁𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑚𝑖𝑥)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽9(𝐴𝑔𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽11(𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12(2006 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽13(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15(𝑀𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽16(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17(𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(17+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                             (1)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the crisis time period, 𝑡 − 1 is the pre-crisis time period (this is 
2006), 𝑛 is the number of country dummies and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the stacked 
vector of the dependent variable, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank buy-and-hold stock returns from July 2007 to 
December 2008, 𝑀𝐵𝑅 is the market-to-book ratio and 𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 are country dummies indicating bank’s 
country.  
For a detailed definition of the variables, see section 3.2 and Appendix A. 
 
 
3.4.2. Corporate Governance Index 
We construct a Corporate Governance Index, (“Governance Index”), based on the corporate governance 
codes and best practices recommendations regarding board characteristics. Here we examine whether bank 
performance in the financial crisis can be attributed to the fact that these institutions were (non)compliant 
with corporate governance codes and best practice recommendations concerning the ten board 
characteristics previously analysed. The arguments we described in the previous section to predict how 
these characteristics are related to bank performance are based on those that the literature most frequently 
reports. However, academics do not all agree on these predictions and sometimes the literature also “defies” 
some governance principles, as is the case with board independence. We use regulation or regulatory 
recommendation concerning each particular characteristic, regardless of the literature’s predictions. The 
Corporate Governance Codes of all the countries in our sample promote board independence, even before 
the crisis. On the other hand, most of them do not make recommendations concerning board size, typically 
only referring to something such as, “the board should be small enough for efficient decision-making. It 
should be large enough for its members to contribute experience and knowledge from different fields and 
for changes to the board's composition to be managed without undue disruption”84(p12) or “the board should 
not be so large as to be unwieldy. The board should be of sufficient size that the balance of skills and 
experience is appropriate for the requirements of the business and that changes to the board’s composition 
can be managed without undue disruption.”85(p5) The exceptions are Spain and Finland whose codes 
mention, respectively, that “in the interests of maximum effectiveness and participation, the Board of 
Directors should ideally comprise no fewer than five and no more than fifteen members.”86(p14)  However, 
“in a relatively small company, a board consisting of three directors may be able to adequately discharge 
the duties pertaining to the board.”87(p7) Following the crisis, the general recommendation is also that the 
board should have a size that enables it to discharge its duties in an efficient manner. The UK’s Walker 
Review88 states that board size will depend on particular circumstances and there can be no general 
prescription as to optimal board size. However, the behavioural studies of the optimal group size prepared 
for this Review report concluded the optimal size for a board is within the range of 8 to 12 people. The 
separation of CEO and Chairman roles is a general recommendation and the division of responsibilities 
between them should be clearly established. Moreover, the codes emphasise that board members must have 
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relevant experience, knowledge, qualifications and competence. The need for industry experience on banks 
and other financial institutions boards is greater than that of non-financial business.88 Although 
improvements in diversity, especially gender diversity, were addressed by some codes even before the 
crisis, this issue gained significantly more relevance following the recent financial turmoil. Numerous 
countries have been implementing boardroom gender quotas.89 For example, since January 1, 2008, Norway 
has enforced a gender quota requirement for corporate board membership at all public limited liability 
companies. They are obliged, by lawh, to ensure that at least 40% of their board directors are women. 
Concerning board busyness, in France, Germany and Denmark, for instance, there are limits on the number 
of directorships directors can holdi. Finally, regarding board activity, the board should meet with the 
necessary frequency to enable in-depth review and discussion of the matters and so effectively perform its 
functions. 
 
The information from corporate governance codes was collected from the European Corporate Governance 
Institute code database.j Data related to best practices recommendations on the characteristics of boards 
was also collected (e.g., Deloitte89). We supplemented this data with data from commercial codes.  
 
Table 1 summarises regulatory policy or recommendations (increase or decrease) in every board 
characteristic in order to improve governance quality. Using these predictions, we hence construct a 
governance index. For each characteristic (except for board size and for CEO duality), we define a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the bank has better than the mean quality governance for that characteristic 
and zero otherwise. For board size, we assign a value of one if it ranges between 8 and 12 members and 
zero otherwise and for CEO duality, a value of one if the CEO is not the Chairman and zero otherwise. The 
governance index is the sum of all dummy variables. A higher value means better quality of governance. 
                                            
h Public Limited Liability Companies Act § 6-11a. 
i For example, article 100(2) of the German Stock Corporations Act prohibits supervisory board members from serving on more 
than ten supervisory boards of any incorporated companies that are legally required to have a supervisory board, although up to 
five additional directorships are allowable for group companies.  
j Available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php, accessed 5 February 2014. 
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A
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ean, 0 otherw
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k In A
nnex 4 of the W
alker report, the TIH
R
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akes the link betw
een understanding the behaviour of board chairs, group dynam
ics and im
proving board perform
ance effectiveness.  
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Our regression model is as follows: 
 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2(2006 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
   + 𝛽3(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5(𝑀𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽6(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7(𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
+ ∑ 𝛽(7+𝑗)(𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                               (2)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the crisis time period, 𝑡 − 1 is the pre-crisis time period (this is, 
2006), 𝑛 is the number of country dummies and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the stacked 
vector of the dependent variable, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank buy-and-hold stock returns from July 2007 to December 
2008, 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the index of the quality of governance, 𝑀𝐵𝑅 is the market-to-book ratio and 
𝐷𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 are country dummies indicating bank’s country.  
For a detailed definition of the variables see section 3.2 and Appendix A. 
 
 
3.5. Summary descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. Panel A presents summary 
descriptive statistics of bank performance (during the crisis). Panel B presents summary descriptive 
statistics of board’s characteristics (before the crisis) and Panel C presents summary descriptive statistics 
of control variables (before the crisis).  
 
Table 2 - Summary descriptive statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of each variable by showing mean, median, standard deviation (Std. dev.), maximum 
(Max.) and minimum (Min.).  
 
Variables # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Panel A: Bank performance variable 
Bank performance (%) 
 
72 -64.50 -66.70 21.41 27.99 -98.87 
Panel B: Board characteristics variables 
Board independence (%) 72 41.45 44.10 28.73 95.45 0.00 
Board size (Nº) 72 16.39 15.00 5.70 31.00 6.00 
CEO duality 72 0.07 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.00 
Board experience (years) 72 12.75 10.78 6.51 35.06 3.00 
Board education (Nº) 72 1.49 1.45 0.71 3.00 0.10 
Women (%) 72 10.87 9.10 10.77 42.90 0.00 
Nationality_mix 70 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.80 0.00 
Age diversity (years) 72 7.48 7.21 2.85 16.60 1.20 
Board busyness (Nº) 72 2.63 2.38 1.01 5.75 1.10 
Board activity (Nº) 58 10.81 10.00 6.26 36.00 4.00 
 
Panel C: Control variables 
2006 performance (%) 72 25.07 20.84 19.61 93.98 -29.25 
Bank size (€ bil.) 72 22.73 11.41 29.59 160.44 0.22 
Capital (%) 72 5.48 5.24 2.71 14.67 1.79 
MBR (%) 72 238.59 209.70 108.61 692.48 47.08 
Institutional ownership (%) 69 44.46 44.32 27.00 100.00 0.03 
CG committee 68 0.18 0.00 0.38 1.00 0.00 
Note: Observations vary because of missing data. 
 
 
The negative average returns during the crisis period reported in Panel A are larger than in other studies, 
such as those of Beltratti and Stulz,3 Fernandes and Fich41 and Fahlenbrach et al.78 Panel B shows that, on 
average, 41.45% of the directors on the board are independent - a much lower average percentage relative 
to other studies (e.g., Pathan and Faff24 and Fernandes and Fich41). Boards have on average 16.39 directors, 
although there is a wide distribution of board size in the sample (a minimum of 6 and a maximum of 31 
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directors). The average number of directors on the board of banks, in our sample, is higher than the average 
number of directors on the board of non-financials firms (e.g., 10.4 in Coles et al,6 9.14 in Francis et al19 
and 12.25 in Yermack,90), confirming that, as evidenced by Adams and Mehran9 and Adams,20 banks have 
larger boards on average. Only 7% of the CEOs in our sample also serve as Chairman of the board. In 
relation to board experience and board education, we find that on average supervisory directors have 12.75 
years of bank experience and hold 1.49 qualifications. The descriptive statistics of board diversity show 
that: (1) the percentage of female supervisory directors is, on average, 10.87%, with a minimum of 0% (no 
women as supervisory directors) and a maximum of 42.90%; (2) nationality_mix is, on average, 0.21, 
exhibiting a minimum of 0, which means that there is no foreign supervisory directors on board, and a 
maximum of 0.80 and (3) age diversity is, on average, 7.48 years, with a minimum of 1.20 years and a 
maximum of 16.60 years. With regard to board busyness, supervisory directors held on average 2.63 
directorships, ranging from 1.10 to 5.75 board positions. The number of board meetings per year is, on 
average, 10.81, ranging from 4 to 36 times per year. Finally, Panel C shows that the stock returns in 2006 
are, on average, 25.07%, with a minimum of -29.25% and a maximum of 93.98%. Bank size is, on average 
€22.73 billion, with a minimum of €0.22 billion and a maximum of €160.44 billion. The quite positively 
skewed distribution of the “Bank size” variable motivates the use of the natural logarithm, ln(Bank Size), 
in the regression analysis. The capital ratio is, on average, 5.48% and the ratio of the market value of equity 
to the book value of equity is, on average, 238.59%, exhibiting high variability. Institutional investors own 
on average 44.67% of banks shares and 18% of our sample banks have a corporate governance committee.  
 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables. Due to the low levels 
of pairwise correlations, multicollinearity is not a sample problem.l  
                                            
l All the pairwise correlations are well below the threshold of 0.8 beyond which multicollinearity is considered a problem (e.g. 
Berry and Feldman,91 Retherford and Choe92 and Gujarati93). Regarding multicollinearity “(…) in practice the pairwise 
correlations usually tell most of the story.” 92(p40)  
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 T
able 3 - C
orrelation m
atrix  
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. 
 
V
ariables 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
1 
B
oard independence 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
B
oard size 
-0.35*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
C
EO
 duality 
-0.06 
-0.08 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
B
oard experience 
-0.25* 
0.24* 
-0.02 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
B
oard education 
0.31** 
-0.24* 
-0.14 
-0.11 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
W
om
en 
0.07 
-0.09 
-0.14 
-0.43*** 
0.07 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
N
ationality_m
ix 
0.25* 
-0.09 
-0.09 
0.09 
0.53*** 
-0.12 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 
A
ge diversity 
-0.11 
0.26* 
0.05 
0.41*** 
-0.21 
-0.16 
-0.15 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
B
oard busyness 
-0.24* 
0.43*** 
0.04 
0.39*** 
0.14 
-0.24* 
0.32** 
0.12 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
B
oard activity 
0.30** 
-0.19 
-0.04 
0.08 
-0.06 
0.15 
-0.26* 
0.10 
-0.18 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
2006 perform
ance 
-0.20 
-0.04 
-0.10 
0.24* 
-0.23* 
-0.19 
-0.20 
-0.06 
0.03 
0.11 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
B
ank size 
0.29** 
0.27** 
0.08 
0.02 
0.40*** 
-0.02 
0.42*** 
-0.07 
0.19 
-0.11 
-0.26* 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
13 
C
apital 
-0.07 
-0.29** 
0.05 
0.10 
-0.05 
-0.31** 
-0.20 
0.09 
-0.10 
0.07 
0.02 
-0.40*** 
1.00 
 
 
 
14 
M
B
R
 
0.18 
-0.47*** 
0.02 
-0.11 
0.12 
-0.04 
0.00 
-0.21 
-0.21 
-0.12 
0.42** 
-0.35*** 
0.21 
1.00 
 
 
15 
Institutional ow
nership 
-0.27** 
0.20 
-0.28** 
0.17 
-0.14 
0.12 
-0.07 
-0.02 
0.09 
-0.16 
0.17 
-0.07 
-0.17 
-0.17 
1.00 
 
16 
C
G
 com
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0.14 
-0.01 
-0.12 
0.10 
0.20 
-0.18 
0.26* 
-0.01 
0.08 
0.05 
0.09 
0.10 
-0.18 
0.09 
-0.14 
1.00 
A
sterisks indicate significance at 1%
 (***), 5%
 (**) and 10%
 (*) levels, using a tw
o-tailed test. Please refer to A
ppendix A
 for the definition of each variable. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1. Results for bank performance and board characteristics 
Table 4 presents the results of the WLS estimations. Columns (1) to (10) report the regression results 
including board characteristics one at a time. Column (11) reports the results of our full regression model.  
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able 4 - R
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The table reports the W
LS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis on board characteristics. 
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--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
32.76*** 
(0.00) 
--- 
--- 
14.41* 
(0.08) 
B
oard busyness 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-78.53* 
(0.09) 
--- 
-39.54* 
(0.09) 
B
oard activity 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
--- 
-22.15*** 
(0.01) 
-2.55 
(0.60) 
2006 perform
ance 
-5.72*** 
(0.00) 
-0.53 
(0.72) 
-3.04 
(0.20) 
-5.11*** 
(0.00) 
-1.92 
(0.48) 
-7.78*** 
(0.01) 
-3.78* 
(0.10) 
-5.17*** 
(0.01) 
-1.76 
(0.47) 
-3.13 
(0.23) 
-2.95* 
(0.10) 
B
ank size 
-18.08 
(0.57) 
32.21 
(0.28) 
16.86 
(0.74) 
74.25*** 
(0.00) 
61.94 
(0.24) 
47.39 
(0.29) 
73.76 
(0.11) 
-66.70* 
(0.10) 
-1.30 
(0.98) 
1.55 
(0.98) 
7.80 
(0.78) 
C
apital 
22.86** 
(0.02) 
27.58*** 
(0.00) 
32.20** 
(0.03) 
21.99** 
(0.05) 
29.72* 
(0.06) 
38.37*** 
(0.01) 
64.83*** 
(0.00) 
31.17*** 
(0.00) 
22.50 
(0.15) 
39.09** 
(0.02) 
16.69* 
(0.06) 
M
B
R
 
0.58*** 
(0.01) 
1.09*** 
(0.00) 
0.94*** 
(0.01) 
1.40*** 
(0.00) 
0.75** 
(0.05) 
1.13*** 
(0.00) 
1.54*** 
(0.00) 
0.57** 
(0.03) 
0.37 
(0.37) 
0.86** 
(0.03) 
0.65*** 
(0.01) 
Institutional ow
nership 
-4.36*** 
(0.00) 
-2.79*** 
(0.00) 
-2.09* 
(0.06) 
1.12 
(0.24) 
-2.00* 
(0.10) 
-3.01*** 
(0.01) 
0.62 
(0.62) 
-1.46* 
(0.07) 
-3.92** 
(0.02) 
-0.61 
(0.64) 
-1.12* 
(0.06) 
C
G
 com
m
ittee 
90.49*** 
(0.00) 
62.23*** 
(0.00) 
60.87*** 
(0.00) 
74.25*** 
(0.00) 
79.35*** 
(0.00) 
106.43*** 
(0.00) 
116.07*** 
(0.00) 
159.31*** 
(0.00) 
43.09 
(0.13) 
79.75*** 
(0.00) 
87.52*** 
(0.01) 
C
ountry dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
bservations 
66 
66 
66 
66 
66 
66 
64 
66 
66 
55 
54 
A
dj-R
2 
0.95 
0.95 
0.88 
0.93 
0.86 
0.89 
0.89 
0.94 
0.87 
0.88 
0.99 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at 1%
 (***), 5%
 (**) and 10%
 (*) levels, using a tw
o-tailed test. Please refer to A
ppendix A
 for the 
definition of each variable. 
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Columns (1) and (11) show that the estimated coefficient on the “Board independence” variable is negative 
and statistically significant, confirming hypothesis H1 that board independence reduced bank performance 
during the financial crisis. The negative impact for independence is consistent with previous studies (e.g., 
Erkens et al18 and Pathan and Faff24). As we found in the US context, board independence also influences 
negatively banks performance in a pan-European context. With regard to the “Board size” variable, both 
the coefficients on the linear and non-linear factors are statistically significant (Column (2)) and thus, 
similarly to Andres and Vallelado11 and Grove et al,29 we find a concave association between the size of 
the board and bank performance. However, when we combine all the variables into a single regression both 
the linear and non-linear board size factors are insignificant. Thus, hypothesis H2 is not confirmed. In regard 
to the “CEO duality” variable, Column (3) reports as predicted, a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, but the joint regression of all the variables shows that the coefficient is positive but insignificant. 
Thus CEO duality has no impact on bank performance, which does not confirm hypothesis H3. With regard 
to the supervisory directors’ banking experience, as expected, banks with more experienced boards 
performed better during the financial crisis, which confirms hypothesis H4. The estimated coefficient on 
the “Board experience” variable is not only statistically significant but also economically significant. The 
working experience of supervisory directors, which is associated with a deep understanding of regulatory 
issues and banking activity specificities and complexity, had a positive and economically important effect 
on the bank´s stock return performance during the recent crisis. This finding confirms the recently frequent 
heard claim for having more financial/banking experts on the boards. On the one hand, a better 
understanding of banking activity helps supervisory directors oversee the management. On the other hand, 
supervisory directors with banking experience provide valuable advice to management. In relation to the 
supervisory directors’ education, the coefficient on the “Board education” variable is not statistically 
significant; hence, we do not find support for hypothesis H5 that more qualified board improves banks 
performance. With regard to gender diversity, the estimated coefficient on the “Women” variable is positive 
and statistically significant. Thus, we find support for hypothesis H6.1 that female supervisory directors 
improve bank performance during the financial crisis, which is in accordance with the Kristof,56 Morris57 
and Treanor58 findings that the lack of women in banks boards contributed to their poor performance. In 
relation to diversity in nationality, the estimated coefficient on the “Nationality_mix” variable is positive 
but not statistically significant. Thus, concerning hypothesis H6.2, we did not find evidence that board 
nationality diversity increases bank performance. Hence, the predominant national focus of the activity of 
many banks in our sample makes local knowledge fundamental, offsetting the advantages relating to 
nationality diversity. Furthermore, in regard to diversity, the estimated coefficient on the “Age diversity” 
variable is positive and statistically significant which is consistent with hypothesis H6.3. Thus, the age 
diversity of supervisory directors improved bank performance during the financial crisis. Concerning the 
busy supervisory directors’ hypothesis (H7), the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the 
“Board busyness” variable indicates, as expected, that supervisory directors holding multiple directorships 
decrease the performance of banks. Thus, our finding provides support for the Busyness Hypothesis. 
Contrary to our expectations, the coefficient on the “Board activity” variable is negative, but statistically 
insignificant. Therefore, the number of annual meetings exhibits no significant impact on bank 
performance.  
 
The estimated coefficients on the control variables offer some further interesting insights. As Beltratti and 
Stulz3 also demonstrate, banks that perform better in 2006 have worse returns during the crisis; in other 
words, the better-performing banks during the crisis had lower returns immediately before the crisis. This 
finding is consistent with the idea that the banks that suffered the most in the crisis seemed to have policies 
that the market favoured before the crisis and/or that these were engaging in riskier activities. When a 
financial crisis occurs, we would expect banks with more capital to perform better. We find that this is the 
case. The statistically significant positive coefficient on the “Capital” variable indicates that highly 
capitalised banks perform better during the crisis as in previous studies (e.g., Pathan and Faff24). Therefore, 
the better-performing banks had less leverage before the crisis. One explanation for this finding is that a 
bank with more capital has a cushion to absorb adverse shocks and is hence better protected against 
financial distress. In addition, the banks most valued by the market relative to their book value exhibited 
better performance. The market valuation of the banks and therefore the market’s growth expectations are 
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positively associated with the performance during the crisis. Our result is consistent with Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz,76 which report a negative relation between the book-to-market ratio and the crisis returns. Consistent 
with Erkens et al18 our analysis finds that institutional ownership is associated with worse stock returns 
during the crisis. Finally, the statistically significant positive coefficient on the “CG committee” variable 
demonstrates that banks with a corporate governance committee perform better during the crisis. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that such banks are able to better periodically review and reassess the 
adequacy of their governance to environmental circumstances and, more timely, recommend any changes. 
Hence, those banks are better able to introduce changes in their governance, having greater flexibility and 
responsiveness. Finally, we note that we find similar results when we use the natural logarithm of assets as 
a proxy for bank size. 
 
 
4.2. Results for bank performance and governance index 
Table 5 reports the results when we use an aggregate governance index instead of individual board 
characteristics.  
 
Table 5 - Relationship between bank performance during the crisis and governance index 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis on governance index, which measures 
governance quality.  
 
       (1) 
Governance index 
 
36.56*** 
(0.00) 
2006 performance -4.09* 
(0.07) 
Bank size -13.50 
(0.77) 
Capital 42.10*** 
(0.00) 
MBR 0.96*** 
(0.01) 
Institutional ownership -0.71 
(0.50) 
CG committee 
 
99.99*** 
(0.00) 
 
Country dummies Yes 
Observations 54 
Adjusted-R-Squared 0.91 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix A for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
Overall, the results show strongly that governance quality, according to corporate governance codes and 
best practices recommendations, measured by the governance index, impacted positively and very 
significantly on bank performance during the crisis. 
 
 
4.3. Bank performance and country-level governance 
In this paper we have primarily focused on the role of corporate boards’ features on banks performance. 
Additionally, the international corporate governance literature suggests that another important dimension 
of corporate governance is the external governance mechanism in a country;79 this is mainly the legal 
institutions that protect shareholders’ rights, both in terms of the quality of a country’s legal institutions 
and laws protecting shareholders’ rights and creditor rights.94 Since our primary analysis includes country 
dummies to control for country-specific factors, it does not address how country-level governance 
influenced the performance of banks during the crisis. Hence, in this section we explore the influence of 
country-level governance on bank performance. As proxy for the quality of legal institutions we use the 
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governance indicators compiled by Kaufmann et al95 for six dimensions of governance: (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory 
quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption and, following Beltratti and Stulz3 and Erkens et al,18 
we consider the simple average of the six governance indicators for each country. We name this index 
“Institutions” where a higher value of the index indicates a better institutional environment. We measure 
the laws protecting shareholders’ rights using the updated antidirector rights index (ADRI) compiled by 
Spamann.96,m A higher value means better shareholders rights. Finally, to assess the impact of the creditor 
rights protection in each country, we use Djankov et al’s97 creditor rights index, named “Creditor rights”, 
which follows that constructed by La Porta et al94 although with minor differences. The index varies 
between 0 (poor creditor rights) and 4 (strong creditor rights). 
 
Our regression model is as follows: 
 
(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐴𝐷𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
   + 𝛽4(2006 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽5(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6(𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 
   + 𝛽7(𝑀𝐵𝑅)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8(𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖,𝑡−1 +   
   + 𝛽9(𝐶𝐺 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                      (3) 
 
where, 𝑖 is the index of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank, 𝑡 is the crisis time period, 𝑡 − 1 is the pre-crisis time period (this is 
2006, except if another year is indicated) and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is the stacked 
vector of the dependent variable, the 𝑖𝑡ℎ bank buy-and-hold stock returns from July 2007 to December 
2008. Institutions is the simple average of six governance indicators: (1) voice and accountability, (2) 
political stability and absence of violence, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of 
law and (6) control of corruption, based on the 2006 index value in Kaufmann et al,95 ADRI is the corrected 
antidirector index of La Porta et al,94 based on the 2005 index value in Spamann96 and Creditor rights is 
the creditor rights index of Djankov et al,97 following that constructed by La Porta et al.94 MBR is the 
market-to-book ratio.  
For a detailed definition of the variables see section 3.2 and Appendix A. 
 
Table 6 reports the analysis on country-level governance variables. Panel A shows the values of the country-
level governance variables. Panel B provides summary descriptive statistics for these variables, while Panel 
C presents the results from the regression analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
m As Erkens et al18 we use the legal institutions variable of Kaufmann et al95 and the antidirector index of Spamann96 because 
we want to utilise an index measured closest to the beginning of the financial crisis. 
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Table 6 - Analysis on country-level governance variables 
 
Panel A: Country-level governance variables 
 
Country Institutions Antidirector rights Creditor rights 
Austria 1.58 4 3 
Belgium 1.35 2 2 
Cyprus 0.97 --- --- 
Denmark 1.82 4 3 
Finland  1.92 4 1 
France 1.21 5 0 
Germany 1.52 4 3 
Greece 0.66 3 1 
Ireland 1.55 4 1 
Italy 0.57 4 2 
Netherlands 1.62 4 2 
Norway 1.70 4 2 
Portugal 1.02 4 1 
Spain 0.92 6 3 
Sweden 1.71 4 2 
Switzerland 1.78 3 1 
UK 1.55 5 4 
 
 
Panel B: Summary descriptive statistics of country-governance variables 
 
Variables # Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Max. Min. 
Institutions 72 1.26 1.43 0.44 1.92 0.57 
ADRI 70 4.14 4 0.95 6 2 
Creditor rights 70 1.90 2 1.02 4 0 
Note: observations vary because of missing data. 
 
 
 
Panel C: Regression of bank performance during the crisis on country-governance variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Institutions -55.75*** 
(0.01) 
--- --- -29.17 
(0.19) 
ADRI --- 27.12*** 
(0.00) 
--- 23.85*** 
(0.01) 
Creditor rights --- --- -7.72 
(0.22) 
-6.85 
(0.26) 
2006 performance -3.61*** 
(0.00) 
-5.66*** 
(0.00) 
-2.91*** 
(0.00) 
-5.55*** 
(0.00) 
Bank size 23.11 
(0.30) 
-32.92 
(0.15) 
9.42 
(0.69) 
-7.97 
(0.76) 
Capital 12.83** 
(0.03) 
1.05 
(0.89) 
25.40*** 
(0.00) 
5.22 
(0.55) 
MBR 
 
0.20 
(0.18) 
-0.04 
(0.77) 
0.20 
(0.23) 
0.17 
(0.27) 
Institutional ownership -3.16*** 
(0.00) 
-4.03*** 
(0.00) 
-2.92*** 
(0.00) 
-3.31*** 
(0.00) 
CG committee 69.88*** 
(0.00) 
48.84*** 
(0.00) 
67.22*** 
(0.00) 
53.17*** 
(0.00) 
Country dummies No No No No 
Observations 66 64 64 64 
Adj-R2 0.84 0.85 0.82 0.85 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix A for the definition of each variable. 
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Columns (1) to (3) report the results one at a time with the control variables, including the country-level 
governance variables. Column (4) presents the full specification and shows that the coefficient on the 
“Institutions” variable is statistically insignificant, meaning that the quality of legal institutions does not 
affect the performance of banks during the financial crisis, as found by Erkens et al18 in a dataset of financial 
firms. On the contrary, the coefficient on the “ADRI” variable is positive and statistically significant. 
Hence, laws protecting shareholders’ rights improved banks’ performance during the financial crisis. 
Differently, Erkens et al18 and van Essen et al81  do not conclude that antidirector rights have a beneficial 
impact, respectively, on financial firms and non-financial firms’ performance during the recent crisis. 
Finally, creditor rights protection has no impact on banks performance, unlike non-financial firms.81  
 
 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1. Alternative definition of the crisis period 
We have investigated the robustness of our results using an alternative crisis period from January 2007 to 
September 2008 as Erkens et al.18 We re-estimate the regression model from Table 4 and Table 5 using this 
alternative crisis period. Table 7 and Table 8 report the results of this analysis. 
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 T
able 7 - R
elationship betw
een bank perform
ance during the crisis and board characteristics using an alternative definition of the crisis period 
The table reports the W
LS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis - January 2007 to Septem
ber 2008 - on board characteristics. 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at 1%
 (***), 5%
 (**) and 10%
 (*) levels, using a tw
o-tailed test. Please refer to A
ppendix A
 for the 
definition of each variable. 
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
B
oard independence 
-1.32*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.40** 
(0.02) 
B
oard size 
 
29.89** 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-22.97 
(0.48) 
B
oard size 2 
 
-0.64* 
(0.10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.64 
(0.44) 
C
EO
 duality 
 
 
-23.44* 
(0.07) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60.97*** 
(0.00) 
B
oard experience 
 
 
 
9.70*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.17** 
(0.03) 
B
oard education 
 
 
 
 
10.91 
(0.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
28.74** 
(0.04) 
W
om
en 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.99*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
4.82** 
(0.03) 
N
ationality_m
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110.59*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
30.02 
(0.46) 
A
ge diversity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15.19*** 
(0.00) 
 
 
9.30* 
(0.08) 
B
oard busyness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-21.05 
(0.34) 
 
-19.95 
(0.19) 
B
oard activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7.42* 
(0.08) 
0.40 
(0.90) 
2006 perform
ance 
-1.46* 
(0.10) 
-0.53 
(0.57) 
-0.30 
(0.79) 
-1.36 
(0.12) 
-0.46 
(0.72) 
-2.30* 
(0.09) 
-0.73 
(0.50) 
-1.37 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.91) 
-0.31 
(0.81) 
-1.13 
(0.24) 
B
ank size 
6.57 
(0.72) 
28.86 
(0.12) 
22.91 
(0.35) 
82.57*** 
(0.00) 
32.71 
(0.19) 
33.74 
(0.13) 
45.41** 
(0.04) 
-19.74 
(0.31) 
22.40 
(0.44) 
19.14 
(0.50) 
16.53 
(0.37) 
C
apital 
25.09*** 
(0.00) 
27.62*** 
(0.00) 
28.84*** 
(0.00) 
24.32*** 
(0.00) 
27.20*** 
(0.00) 
31.50*** 
(0.00) 
44.31*** 
(0.00) 
28.61*** 
(0.00) 
25.95*** 
(0.00) 
31.03*** 
(0.00) 
16.09*** 
(0.01) 
M
B
R
 
0.27** 
(0.03) 
0.50*** 
(0.00) 
0.41** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.00) 
0.36** 
(0.04) 
0.50*** 
(0.00) 
0.71*** 
(0.00) 
0.26** 
(0.04) 
0.24 
(0.23) 
0.38** 
(0.05) 
0.09 
(0.56) 
Institutional ow
nership 
-2.14*** 
(0.00) 
-1.32*** 
(0.01) 
-1.19** 
(0.03) 
0.30 
(0.50) 
-0.98* 
(0.09) 
-1.57*** 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.92) 
-0.91** 
(0.02) 
-1.66** 
(0.04) 
-0.69 
(0.29) 
-0.64* 
(0.10) 
C
G
 com
m
ittee 
72.49*** 
(0.00) 
62.28*** 
(0.00) 
60.93*** 
(0.00) 
65.57*** 
(0.00) 
63.25*** 
(0.00) 
79.05*** 
(0.00) 
85.08*** 
(0.00) 
105.03*** 
(0.00) 
57.88*** 
(0.00) 
67.90*** 
(0.00) 
82.26*** 
(0.00) 
C
ountry dum
m
ies 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
Y
es 
O
bservations 
66 
66 
66 
66 
66 
66 
64 
66 
66 
55 
54 
A
dj-R
2 
0.97 
0.97 
0.94 
0.97 
0.94 
0.95 
0.95 
0.97 
0.94 
0.94 
0.99 
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In respect to Table 7 then, we find that board independence, board experience, female supervisory directors 
(gender diversity), age diversity, bank’s capital, institutional ownership and corporate governance 
committee maintain their impact on bank performance.n Hence, our conclusions on the relation between 
bank performance during the crisis and board characteristics are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
Table 4.  
 
 
Table 8 - Relationship between bank performance during the crisis and governance index using an 
alternative definition of the crisis period 
The table reports the WLS regression results of stock returns of banks during the crisis - January 2007 to September 2008 - on 
governance index, which measures governance quality.  
 
 (1) 
Governance index 18.72*** 
(0.00) 
2006 performance -0.98 
(0.32) 
Bank size 1.28 
(0.95) 
Capital 34.29*** 
(0.00) 
MBR 
 
0.45*** 
(0.00) 
Institutional ownership -0.51 
(0.28) 
CG committee 
 
78.64*** 
(0.00) 
Country dummies Yes 
Observations 54 
Adj-R2 0.97 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix A for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
Regarding Table 8, we also conclude that the quality of governance, measured by an index of governance, 
impacts positively on bank performance. Therefore, our conclusion is not sensitive to an alternative 
definition of the crisis period. 
 
 
5.2. Additional econometric issues 
Endogeneity is a common issue in governance studies that makes interpretation of the results difficult. As 
Hermalin and Weisbach14 point out, board characteristics and firm performance are endogenously and not 
exogenously determined. While this issue is less likely to be problematic in our analysis because the 
financial crisis is mostly an exogenous macroeconomic shock,17 we mitigate the endogeneity issue in some 
ways. First, we measure all board variables at the end of 2006 just before the beginning of the crisis, while 
measuring bank performance during the crisis. Therefore, our empirical framework mitigates the 
endogeneity issue due to reverse causality as bank crisis performance is regressed on (lagged) pre-crisis 
variables. Second, we examine board characteristics changes from 2005 to 2006. If the banks’ boards could 
anticipate the crisis, it is expected that at least some board characteristics exhibit a drastic change; for 
example, banks’ boards could hire directors with more banking experience. Similarly, the boards could 
have increased their meeting frequency in order to deal with the looming crisis. In Table 9 it is compared 
the board characteristics in 2005 and 2006. The results show that there are no significant differences 
between 2005 and 2006 regarding board characteristics. In fact, none of them is significantly different 
                                            
n We also note that board busyness now has no impact on the performance of banks, contrary to CEO duality and board education 
which have a positive impact. 
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between the two years, indicating that the financial crisis was an unexpected event in the view of the bank´s 
board of directors. 
 
Table 9 - Univariate comparison of board characteristics between 2005 and 2006 
The table compares the characteristics of the board of banks in 2005 and 2006.  
 
Variables Mean 2005 
 
Mean 2006 
 
Test for Equality of Means 
(p-values) 
Board independence 42.808 41.449 0.78 
Board size 16.442 16.389 0.96 
CEO Duality 0.086 0.069 0.72 
Board experience 11.672 12.751 0.30 
Board education 1.435 1.486 0.67 
Women 11.359 10.872 0.80 
Nationality_mix 0.208 0.209 0.98 
Age diversity 7.525 7.485 0.93 
Board busyness 2.735 2.631 0.54 
Board activity 10.556 10.810 0.82 
The p-values of coefficient significance are in brackets and asterisks indicate significance at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
levels, using a two-tailed test. Please refer to Appendix A for the definition of each variable. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
This research was conducted to investigate how supervisory board characteristics have affected bank 
performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Establishing an understanding of the supervisory board 
roles is of significant importance for policymakers, supervisory authorities and other public entities. Using 
buy-and-hold stock returns as a measure of bank performance we find that the better-performing banks 
during the crisis had in 2006, less independent boards, boards with more banking experience and diversity 
(gender and age) and less busy supervisory directors. Moreover, such banks enjoyed lower returns in 2006, 
alongside higher capital and market-to-book ratios and lower institutional ownership, while possessing a 
corporate governance committee. Our results are robust to an alternative definition of the crisis period as 
well as to the endogeneity issue. The findings in our study support the notion that board characteristics are 
an important determinant of bank performance and provide a clear understanding into why some banks 
were more affected by the crisis than others. 
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A
ppendix A
 – V
ariables definitions 
V
ariables 
D
efinitions 
M
easurem
ent period 
D
ata sources 
B
ank perform
ance 
B
uy-and-hold stock returns. Specifically, for each bank, the annual 
stock return is calculated as the natural logarithm
ic of the ratio of the 
stock price (adjusted), that is, 𝑙𝑛 (𝑃𝑖𝑡 /𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 ). 
July 
2007 
to 
D
ecem
ber 
2008; 
alternatively, 
January 2007 to Septem
ber 2008 
D
atastream
 
B
oard independence 
Percentage of independent directors, that is, the num
ber of independent 
board directors on the board divided by board size. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
B
oard size 
Total num
ber of directors serving on the board of the bank. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
C
EO
 duality 
A
 dum
m
y variable equal to 1 if the C
EO
 is also the C
hairm
an, 
0 otherw
ise. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx; A
nnual R
eports 
B
oard experience 
Supervisory directors’ average years of experience in the banking 
sector. To track banking experience w
e exam
ine each supervisory 
director’s biography as provided in the B
oardE
x database. First, w
e 
com
pute the num
ber of years each supervisory director has w
orked in 
the banking sector and sum
 all these years. Second, w
e divide this total 
by the num
ber of supervisory directors on the board of the bank. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
B
oard education 
A
verage num
ber of qualifications, that is, sum
 of the num
ber of 
qualifications held by the supervisory directors divided by the total 
num
ber of supervisory directors.  
A
ll qualifications have a count of one. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
W
om
en 
Percentage of fem
ale supervisory directors on the board, that is, the 
num
ber 
of 
w
om
an 
supervisory 
directors 
divided 
by 
the 
total 
supervisory directors. M
easures gender diversity. 
 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
 N
ationality_m
ix 
Proportion of supervisory directors from
 different countries. M
easures 
nationality diversity. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
A
ge diversity 
Standard 
deviation 
of 
supervisory 
directors’ 
age. 
M
easures 
age 
diversity. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
 
B
oard busyness  
A
verage num
ber of board positions (num
ber of directorships) held by 
supervisory directors. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx 
 
B
oard activity 
A
nnual num
ber of board m
eetings. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
D
atastream
 
2006 perform
ance 
B
uy-and-hold stock returns. 
January 2006 to D
ecem
ber 2006 
D
atastream
 
B
ank size 
N
atural logarithm
 of the bank’s m
arket capitalization. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
D
atastream
 
C
apital 
B
ank capital, com
puted as the ratio of total equity to total assets. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
D
atastream
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V
ariables 
D
efinitions 
M
easurem
ent period 
D
ata sources 
M
B
R
  
M
arket-to-book ratio, that is, the ratio of the m
arket value of equity to 
the book value of equity.  
D
ecem
ber 2006 
D
atastream
  
Institutional ow
nership 
Percentage of shares ow
ned by institutional investors. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
Thom
son Financial 
C
G
 com
m
ittee 
A
 dum
m
y variable equal to 1 if the bank has a corporate governance 
com
m
ittee, 0 otherw
ise. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx; A
nnual R
eports 
G
overnance index 
Index of the quality of governance. For each characteristic (except for 
board size and for C
EO
 duality), a dum
m
y variable is defined, w
hich 
is equal to 1 if the bank has better than the m
ean quality governance 
for that characteristic and 0 otherw
ise. For board size a value of 1 is 
assigned if it ranges betw
een 8 and 12 m
em
bers and 0 otherw
ise. For 
C
EO
 duality a value of 1 is assigned if the C
EO
 is not the C
hairm
an 
and 0 otherw
ise. G
overnance index is the sum
 of all dum
m
y variables. 
A
 higher value m
eans better quality of governance. 
D
ecem
ber 2006 
B
oardEx; A
nnual 
R
eports; D
atastream
 
Institutions 
The sim
ple average of six governance indicators: (1) voice and 
accountability, (2) political stability, (3) governm
ent effectiveness, (4) 
regulatory quality, (5) rule of law
 and (6) control of corruption. 
2006 
K
aufm
ann et al 95 
A
D
R
I 
A
ntidirector rights. The corrected antidirector index of La Porta et al, 94 
by Spam
ann. 96 
2005 
Spam
ann
96 
C
reditor rights 
The index aggregating creditor rights by D
jankov et al, 97 follow
ing that 
constructed by La Porta et al. 94 
2004 
D
jankov et al 97 
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83. Bischof, J., Brüggemann, U. and Daske, H. (2011) Fair value reclassifications of financial assets during the financial crisis, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1628843 
 
84. Corporate Governance Codes and Principles – Belgium (2004) Belgian corporate governance code, 9 December, 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=154, accessed 16 June 2014. 
 
85. Corporate Governance Codes and Principles – United Kingdom (2006) The combined code on corporate governance, 23 
July, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=119, accessed on 16 June 2014. 
 
86. Corporate Governance Codes and Principles – Spain (2006) Unified good governance code, 19 May, 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=244, accessed on 16 June 2014. 
 
87. Corporate Governance Codes and Principles – Finland (2003) Corporate governance recommendations for listed companies, 
December, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=36, accessed on 16 June 2014. 
 
88. Walker, D. (2009) A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other financial industry entities: Final 
recommendations, 26 November, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=270, accessed on 16 June 2014. 
 
 32 
89. Deloitte (2013) Women in the boardroom: A global perspective, March, 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-ccg-women-in-the-boardroom.pdf, accessed 2 July 
2014. 
 
90. Yermack, D. (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics 
40(2): 185-211. 
 
91. Berry, W. D. and Feldman, S. (1985) Multiple Regression in Practice. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 
 
92. Retherford, R. D. and Choe, M. K. (1993) Statistical Models for Causal Analysis. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
93. Gujarati D. N. (2004) Basic Econometrics. 4th ed. New York: MacGraw-Hill. 
 
94. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Visnhy, R. W. (1998) Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy 
106(6): 1113-55. 
 
95. Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2009 Governance matters VIII: aggregate and individual governance indicators 
1996-2008. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 4978, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1424591 
 
96. Spamann, H. (2010) The 'antidirector rights index' revisited. The Review of Financial Studies 23(2): 467-86. 
 
97. Djankov, S., McLiesh, C. and Shleifer, A. (2007) Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84(2): 299-
329. 
 
View publication stats
